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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal presents several questions concerning the attempted performance of a contract 
arising out of a proposed real estate development of several parcels of residential real estate in 
Canyon County, and whether the District Court erred in not ordering appropriate remedies in either · 
the full enforcement of the contract itself, or by providing alternative implied contract remedies. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This action was originally commenced in November, 2009, as a proceeding for declaratory 
relief, quiet title, and unjust enrichment that was brought by Eugene ("Roy") and Janet Rice, as 
husband and wife, and by two Idaho limited liability companies controlled by the Rices, Real 
Homes, LLC ("Real Homes") and Real Properties, LLC ("Real Properties"), as plaintiffs. 
These named plaintiffs asked the District Court declare a "Purchase and Sale Agreement" 
to be valid and enforceable (149), and specifically that the Plaintiff, Real Properties LLC, was the 
"rightful owner of Real Homes, L.L.C., and all the assets thereof," including the transferred real 
estate (1 50). (R., pg 29). The "Purchase and Sale Agreement," at issue was attached as 
"Exhibit D" to the complaint. (R., pp. 67-72) and was later admitted at trial as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 
41. 
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A second count of the complaint requested the District Court enter a decree quieting title in 
the real property that had been transferred as a part of the Purchase and Sale Agreement to the 
Plaintiff, Real Properties, LLC. (i) 58, R., pg. 30). 1 The second and third counts of the complaint 
requested remedies against the Defendants Trefren (i! 63, R., pg. 31 ), Baird, and Sallaz (i! 74, R., 
pg. 32) for goods and services that had been provided to them by the plaintiffs. 
Count V, which was the only claim upon which the plaintiffs ultimately proceeded to trial 
in November, 2013, stated a claim for "Breach of Contact in the Alternative." This claim was 
premised upon the existence of a prior determination to be made by the district court that the 
parties' Purchase and Sale Agreement was not enforceable, and that title to the real property at 
issue should not be quieted in Real Properties, LLC. (i! 81, R., pg. 33). In that event, the 
plaintiffs requested alternative relief in the form of damages paid for the attempted performance of 
the Purchase and Sale Agreement (i! 85, R., pp. 34-35). 
Finally, Count VI, stated an additional basis for recovery on the alternative contract claim 
stated in Count V, as based upon unjust enrichment. (R., pp. 35-36). 
The defendants appeared and answered these claims as originally made by the plaintiffs. 
Answer with Affirmative Defenses from Defendant Sallaz, (01/10/11, R., pp. 132-138). 
Defendant Glenn Trefren and Tradesman Contractors and Construction LLC filed an Amended 
Answer with Counterclaim (07/06/12, R., pp. 326-335). The plaintiffs filed a reply to 
The complaint misidentifies the properties as being described in "Exhibit C" to the 
complaint, when they were in fact described in "Exhibit D" to the complaint (R., pp. 71-72). 
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Tradesman's counterclaim on July 25, 2012 (R., pp. 352-361). 
On June 29, 2012 the District Court granted plaintiffs' motion to voluntarily dismiss all 
counts in its complaint, except alternative Count V. (R., pg. 9 - a copy of that order has not been 
produced as a part of the record on this appeal). 
On November 20, 21, 22, and 25, 2013, the case proceeded to trial on Plaintiffs' 
Alternative Count V, which was plaintiffs' request for money damages, which was entirely 
dependent for its success upon a determination that Renee Baird was the sole owner/member of 
Real Homes LLC. The counterclaimants, Sallaz and Trefren, proceeded to trial on their 
counterclaims for breach of the January 2006 "Purchase and Sale Agreement" they had entered 
into with Real Properties, LLC, on the basis they were the sole owners/members of Real Homes, 
LLC who, as the owners, were entitled to enter into that Agreement. In addition, Trefren pursued 
several counterclaims for unjust enrichment on behalf of his separate entity limited liability 
company, Tradesman Contractors Construction LLC, for those services and materials provided to 
the plaintiffs. 
The District Court issued its memorandum decision and order on February 28, 2014 (R., 
pp. 551-587), with judgment filed on February 28, 2014 (R., pp. 588-589). The District Court 
rejected Renee Baird's claim to ownership to Real Homes, LLC, and on that basis dismissed 
plaintiff's Count V, and denied all requested relief sought by plaintiffs. Although the District 
Court found that Sallaz and Trefren had entered into an enforceable contract with Real Properties, 
LLC, which Agreement Real Properties had breached, the District Court also found that the 
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actions of Sallaz and Trefren had triggered a dissolution of Real Homes, LLC, which prevented 
them from transferring Real Homes, LLC to Real Properties, LLC, in full performance of the 
contract. On the basis of those findings, the District Court refused any enforcement of the 
contract, or the provision of any alternative implied contract remedies to Sallaz and Trefren. 
Sallaz and Trefren filed a Motion for Reconsideration, or to Alter or Amend, and to 
Clarify, on March 13, 2014 (R., pp. 597-618). The District Court entered its order on this motion 
on April 8, 2014, denying any further relief. (R., pp. 800-809). 
The Notice of Appeal to this Court was timely filed May 2014 (R., 825-831 ). 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Formation of Real Homes LLC 
In early 2001, Dennis Sallaz and Glenn Trefren decided to enter into a business venture to 
develop several parcels of residential property in the vicinity of Lake Lowell and other property 
within the city of Nampa in Canyon County, which throughout these proceedings will be 
collectively referred to as the "Riverside property." (Sallaz, Tr., pg. 858, L. 7, to pg. 859, L. 11).2 
Sallaz and Trefren formed an Idaho limited liability company under the name, Real Homes, LLC., 
to carry out this development venture. (Sallaz, Tr., pg. 861, LL. 15-25; Trefren, Tr., pg. 573, LL. 
2 Excluding the parcel that was eventually deeded to Renee Baird as her separate 
property at 15584 Riverside Road, the collective grouping of residential development property 
which for convenience will be hereinafter referred to as the "Riverside property" consists of four 
separate developable lots on Riverside Drive (Trefren, Tr., pg. 626, LL. 4-13; Tr. pg, 664, LL 
11-14) and three to four potentially developable lots located at 714 Smith A venue in Nampa, 
Idaho. (Trefren, Tr., pg. 630, LL. 5-24). 
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1-18). 
Under the terms of the "official" operating agreement for Real Homes, LLC, Sallaz and 
Trefren were the only two members of that LLC, with each of them contributing an agreed value of 
$25,000, either in cash, or its equivalent. (Sallaz, Tr., pg. 866, LL. 10-23). Although Dennis 
Sallaz's then-wife, Renee Baird, had testified at trial that she was the 100% "owner" of Real 
Homes, LLC (R., pp. 566-67; Baird, Tr., pg. 50, LL. 15-19), the District Court rejected Ms. Baird's 
testimony, and instead found as follows: 
Based on the lack of any evidence that Ms. Baird provided consideration in 
exchange for her claimed interest in Real Homes, the court concludes that 
Plaintiff has not established that Ms. Baird was a member, much less the only 
member, of Real Homes, LLC at the time of execution of the Agreement. 
Since Plaintiff based its Count V breach of contract claim on establishing that Ms. 
Baird was the only member of Real Homes, LLC, the court also concludes that 
Plaintiff failed to prove all the required elements of its Count V breach of contract 
claim and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count V must be granted. [ footnote 
omitted] 
Memorandum Decision and Order at pg. 19, (R., pg. 569, bracketed reference and emphasis 
added).3 
2. The Pre-Divorce Separation of Renee Baird and Dennis Sallaz 
3 Judge Kerrick's finding that Sallaz and Trefren were the 100% owners of Real 
Homes LLC, rather than Renee Baird, was a result opposite of that which had been reached by 
Judge Epis in the Sallaz divorce trial, in which Ms. Baird was in fact found to be the 100% owner 
of that entity. (Complaint, Exh. E, R pg. 96). Although there still is no Oregon public record that 
supports the formation of the Sallaz-Baird marriage, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the 
existence of that marriage, including the community property interests that Ms. Baird derived from 
her "ownership" of Real Homes, on what can only be characterized as a pseudo-common law basis 
in Baird-Sallaz v. Sallaz, 157 Idaho 342, 336 P.3d 275 (2014). 
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During this same period of time that Real Homes, LLC was formed, and Sallaz and Trefren 
were entering into their venture for the development of the Riverside properties, the marriage 
between Sallaz and Baird was less than perfect. Glen Trefren, as a 50% owner of Real Homes 
was becoming increasingly concerned about Renee Baird's dealings with the assets of Real Homes 
LLC. So in response, he proposed, and Dennis Sallaz agreed, to have the assets of Real Homes 
transferred to Tradesman Contractors and Construction LLC, which Trefren controlled, and which 
action would put those assets out of Baird's reach. (Trefren, Tr., pg. 621, L. 14 to pg. 623, L. 11). 
As to the issues raised on this appeal, the most significant aspect of this transfer of assets 
from Real Homes to Tradesman Contractors is that it was actually Tradesman Contractors which 
transferred the real estate that was the subject of the Purchase and Sale Agreement to Real 
Properties LLC on behalf of Real Homes, LLC. (See, Defs Exh. E, F, G, & H). 
The only other significant fact as Renee Baird's dealings in Real Homes, LLC's property is 
that she and Dennis Sallaz did transfer one of the Riverside properties, which was located 15584 
Riverside, also identified as Lot 1 B, into their names, in order to obtain a personal loan to finish the 
remodeling of that property. (Baird, Tr., pg. 64, L. 18 to pg. 65, L. 5). In a direct settlement of 
the claims she may have had in this action, Roy Rice quitclaimed whatever interest he had in that 
property to Ms. Baird. (Baird, Tr., pg. 304- L. 3 to pg. 306, L. 1); Plaintiffs Exh. 162. 
The plaintiffs in this action made a substantial effort to bootstrap their claims, as made in 
this action, upon the decision of the magistrate court in the Sallaz divorce proceeding, which at the 
time this case was tried, was pending on appeal before the Idaho Supreme Court. Ultimately, 
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Judge Kerrick rejected those arguments, and independently ruled that Ms. Baird was not the owner 
of Real Homes, LLC, contrary to the ruling on that question which had been made in the divorce 
proceeding. With that issue decided, and there being no issue raised as to Ms. Baird's ownership 
of 15584 Riverside, as confirmed by the quitclaim deed obtained from Roy Rice, the only 
questions that remained were those concerning the interpretation and enforcement of the 2006 
Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
3. Pending Foreclosure of the Riverside Properties - The Purchase-Sale 
Agreement 
The Riverside properties had been originally purchased by Glenn Trefren from Saxton 
Fruit Farms. (Trefren, Tr., pg. 570, L. 1 to pg. 571, L. 18). In January 2006 Real Homes, LLC 
was in imminent danger of losing those properties to foreclosure, unless that Saxton Fruit Farms 
loan could be paid off, or a source of refinancing could be found. Sallaz and Trefren turned to 
Roy Rice. The "Purchase and Sale Agreement," dated January 6, 2006, and admitted as 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 41, was negotiated by the parties by which Real Homes, LLC was sold to Rice, 
including all of its assets, which Agreement included the following provisions: 
WHEREAS, Sellers each hold 100% ownership interest in Real Homes 
LLC, which is all of the ownership interest therein, an LLC formed and recorded 
with the Idaho Secretary of State on January 19, 2001, and 
WHEREAS, it is the mutual desire of the parties hereto that Sellers shall 
sell to the Buyer all of said Ownership Interest and all right, title and interest in and 
to all real property owned by Real Homes, LLC as sort forth on Exhibit A attached 
hereto. 
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**** 
IT IS HEREBY AGREED by and between the parties as follows: 
1. Sellers hereby agrees to sell to Buyer and Buyer hereby agrees to 
purchase from the Sellers, all of said Ownership Interest owned by Sellers, being all 
of the Ownership Interest thereof, subject to the terms and conditions herein set 
forth. 
2. It is understood and agreed that the total purchase price for said 
Ownership Interest shall be the sum of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand and no/100 
Dollars ($250,000), lawful money of the United States of America, to be paid by 
the Buyer to the Seller as follows: 
(a) Buyer shall assume all recorded encumbrances against all real 
properties owned by Real Homes, LLC; including, but not limited 
to, D.L. Evans Bank, Perry Harding, CPA, and Canyon County 
Property taxes and Buyer shall hold Sellers harmless therefrom. 
(b) Said encumbrances include that certain Note and Deed of Trust held 
by Saxton Fruit Farms dated 02/13/2001 which is in default and set 
for foreclosure sale on January 6, 2006, and Buyer agrees to pay 
same in full prior to sale. 
( c) The balance of said purchase price after payment of the title 
encumbrances shall then be paid by Buyer to Sellers in two equal 
cash shares from the net proceeds from sales, income or other 
disposition of any or all of the said properties herein. In any event 
said payment shall be made no later than 24 months from the date 
hereof. 
( d) Provided, however, that Buyer agrees to give Seller Dermis J. Sallaz 
an advance of $5,000.00 as partial payment on his Attorney fees due 
to Jim Bevis prior to April 10, 2006. 
3. Sellers represent, warrant and agree with the Buyer as follows: 
(a) That the Ownership Interest which is being sold herein constitutes 
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100% of the Ownership of Real Homes, LLC; 
(b) The Sellers have good and marketable title to said Ownership 
Interest being sold and transferred hereunder with absolute right to 
sell, assign and transfer same to Buyer free and clear of all liens, 
pledges, security interests or encumbrances and without breach of 
any agreement to which he is a party. 
( c) The Sellers covenant that all real properties owned by Real Homes, 
LLC and being transferred herein are free and clear of all 
encumbrances not listed herein. 
( d) Real Homes, LLC has free and clear title to said real properties and 
Sellers shall execute any and all documents requested by Buyer to 
transfer all interest therein to Buyer. 
( e) Time is agreed to be of the essence of this Agreement and the 
performance thereof. 
This Agreement was executed by Real Properties, LLC, by Eugene L. Rice as Manager, by 
Glenn Trefren and Dennis L. Sallaz, as "Co-owners," and was also signed by Trefren on behalf of 
Real Homes, LLC. 
Roy Rice - from his personal funds, rather than from Real Properties, LLC's funds paid 
the $63,402.83 to Saxton Fruit Farms to cure the default on the Riverside properties, (Rice, Tr., pg. 
430, L. 20 to pg. 431, L. 2), and made the $5,000 payment to Dennis Sallaz, (Rice, Tr., pg. 432, L. 
2-17), but otherwise neither Rice nor the LLC entities he controlled ever substantially performed 
according to the terms of the "Purchase and Sale Agreement" in satisfying their obligation to 
tender a total payment of $250,000 for the transfer of the Real Homes, LLC interests of Sallaz and 
Trefren, including payment for the transfer of the Riverside properties. 
For their part of the performance under the "Purchase and Sale Agreement," the Riverside 
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properties were in fact transferred to Rice's entity, Real Properties, LLC from Tradesman LLC by 
Trefren, on behalf of Real Homes, LLC. (Trefren, Tr., pg. 668, LL. 9-22; pg. 671, LL. 10-16; 
Defendants' Exh. E, F, G, & H). At some later point in time, Rice transferred the Riverside 
Properties from Real Properties, LLC to another entity he controlled that is known as, Ada 
Properties, LLC. (Rice, Tr., pg. 529, L. 24 to pg. 530, L. 4). In whose ownership they are 
believed to remain to this day. 
During the course of these proceedings, Roy Rice had been in poor and declining health, 
and he did pass away on August 19, 2014, as reflected by the November 25, 2014 Idaho Supreme 
Court order amending the caption in this appeal. 
Two findings made by the District Court are significant to the issues raised on this appeal. 
First, is the District Court's declaration that by the terms of the above-recited "Purchase and Sale 
Agreement," the parties entered into an enforceable express contract: 
The express language of the Agreement, together with the evidence 
adduced at trial, is sufficient to establish that Real Properties, LLC and Sallaz and 
Trefren had a distinct and common understanding that Sallaz and Trefren would 
transfer their member interests in Real Homes, LLC, and Real Homes, LLC would 
transfer all real property it owned [footnote omitted], to Real Properties, LLC in 
return for payment of $250,000 to Sallaz and Trefren. 
(Memorandum Decision and Order at pp. 20-21, R., pp. 570-71) (bracketed referenced to, 
"footnote omitted," added). 
Second, is the determination that was made by the District Court that the transfer of assets 
by Real Homes, LLC under the terms of the Purchase and Sale Agreement "triggered" an 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF -PAGE 16 
automatic dissolution of Real Homes, LLC, which dissolution then operated as a breach by 
Sallaz and Trefren of the covenant they had made under Part 3(b) of the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement that they had the "absolute right to sell, assign and transfer" those assets to the buyer. 
In reaching this conclusion the District Court reasoned as follows: 
Pursuant to Idaho Code section 53-642, a "limited liability company is 
dissolved and its affairs shall be wound up upon the happening of the first to occur 
of the following: (1) At the time or upon the occurrence of events specified in 
writing in the articles of organization or an operating agreement" ( emphasis added). 
Idaho Code section 53-644 authorized persons winding up the business or affairs of 
a limited liability company to perform a number of actions, none of which includes 
the transfer of membership interests to third parties. 
Based upon the evidence before it, the court finds that the property 
transferred by Real Homes, LLC to Real Properties, LLC pursuant to the 
Agreement constituted all or substantially all of Real Homes, LLC's assets. By 
operation of the terms of the operating agreement and applicable Idaho statutes, 
Real Homes dissolved upon execution of the Agreement. Upon such 
dissolution, Real Homes, LLC's business and affairs were required to be wound up. 
The applicable statute did not authorize the transfer of a member interest in 
the winding up process. 
In light of the above, the court concludes that Treferen [sic] and Sallaz 
breached the covenant that they had the "absolute right to sell, assign and transfer 
same to Buyer ... without any breach of any agreement to which" they were a party 
and, in fact, were not authorized to transfer the member interests in Real Homes to 
Real Properties. In addition, the court concludes that such breach defeated the 
fundamental purpose of the Agreement, as between Trefren and Sallaz as 
"co-owners" and Real Properties, LLC, to transfer all of the ownership interest in 
Real Homes, LLC to Real Properties. Accordingly, Count I of the Counterclaim is 
dismissed. 
Memorandum Decision and Order at pp. 25-26. (R., pp. 575-76) (bold/underlined emphasis 
added). 
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Notwithstanding the District Court's determination, as highlighted above, that, "Real 
Homes dissolved upon execution of the Agreement," that court had also observed at the beginning 
of its analysis of this particular claim (Counterclaim Count I) that: 
Real Homes, LLC is not a party to the counterclaim and has not asserted 
any claim with respect to the real property transferred to Real Properties, LLC 
pursuant to the Agreement. 
Memorandum Decision and Order at pg. 20. (R., pg. 570). 
Roy Rice and perhaps now his estate and the entities he controlled, specifically Real 
Properties, LLC and Ada Properties, LLC, and not the counterclaimants Sallaz and Trefren - have 
remained in full control of Real Homes, LLC from the time Sallaz and Trefren transferred their 
member interests in Real Homes, LLC to Real Properties, LLC pursuant to the terms of the 
January 6, 2006 Purchase and Sale Agreement up to the present. Consequently, Sallaz and 
Trefren had no ability to assert any claim on behalf of Real Homes, LLC to reclaim the transferred 
real property, and certainly neither Roy Rice, nor his successors, had any desire nor any incentive 
in voluntarily giving up the apparent windfall Rice had received in the transfer of that real property 
for the paltry payment of $68,402.83 that had been paid by Rice for its transfer caused to take place 
through Sallaz and Trefren. 
D. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The question of whether an enforceable express contract exists, presents a question of fact 
for the trier of fact to resolve. Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 636,645,249 P.3d 829,838 (2011). 
However, that question can also be determined as a matter of law by the court. Id. at 644, 249 
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P.3d at 837 ("[W]e determine that the written contracts are enforceable as a matter oflaw, .... "). 
On appeal of a trial court's decision at a bench trial, the stand of review is whether the 
evidence support the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of 
law. City of Meridian v. Petra Inc., 154 Idaho 425, 434-35, 299 P.3d 232, 241-42 (2013). The 
trial court's findings should only be set aside when they are clearly erroneous. Id. 
II. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court err in finding that Sallaz and Trefren would be in immediate 
breach of the 2006 Purchase and Sale Agreement upon any attempt at actual 
performance of that Agreement, even though it was otherwise a valid and 
enforceable contract? 
2. If the 2006 Purchase and Sale Agreement could not be enforced by Sallaz and 
Trefren, should they be entitled to alternative remedies in the nature of restitution? 
3. If the District Court is reversed should Sallaz and Trefren be entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees in the proceedings before the district court? 





The District Court Erred In Holding That Sallaz And Trefren Were 
Prohibited From Recovering Damages Arising Out Of The Breach Of What 
The Court Had Otherwise Held To Be An Enforceable Contract 
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At the trial conducted in November, 2013, the court found that the evidence presented by 
Sallaz and Trefren had established the existence of an enforceable contract with Real Properties, 
LLC, based upon the 2006 Purchase and Sale Agreement in the amount of $250,000. 
Furthermore, the District Court found that Real Properties had breached this contract, and that 
Sallaz and Trefren were entitled to damages in the apparent principal amount of $181,597.18, as 
pled on the face of Count I of their counterclaim. (R., pg. 573). Notwithstanding these findings, 
the District Court also found that Real Properties LLC had established an affirmative defense to 
this contract claim, which affirmative defense had rendered any actual performance of the terms of 
that contract by Sallaz and Trefren to be impossible under the provisions of LC. § 53-644.4 (R., 
pp. 573-76). 
4 Prior to undertaking its analysis the district court briefly looked at whether it should 
apply the "Uniform Act," which became effective July 1, 2008, and currently governs limited 
liability companies in Idaho, see, LC.§ 30-6-101 et seq., or that Act's predecessor, the "LLC Act," 
which was first enacted in 1993, and was codified at LC. § 53-601 et seq. See, Memorandum 
Decision at pg. 15 (R., pg. 565). Based upon a determination that, "There is no evidence in the 
record that Real Homes, LLC was ever governed by the provisions of the Uniform Act during the 
period relevant to the claims asserted in this action." (R., pg. 565), the district court has relied upon 
and applied the provisions from the former "LLC Act." The Sallaz and Trefren Appellants have 
no objections to the application of the provisions of the "LLC Act," but only argue that the district 
court reached the wrong result in its application of those sections to the facts of this appeal. 
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The 2006 Purchase and Sale Agreement (Pl's Exh. 41) only required Sallaz and Trefren to 
do two things. First, in ,i 3(a) & (b) Sallaz and Trefren were required to convey 100% of their 
membership interests in Real Homes, LLC to Real Properties LLC. 5 Second, in ,i 3(c) & (d) 
Sallaz and Trefren were required to oversee the conveyance of the real estate that was identified in 
5 The district court found nothing objectionable under the applicable Idaho statutes 
to the actual transfer of a "membership interest" in an Idaho limited liability company. 
As provided by LC. § 53-636(1)(a) "A limited liability company interest is assignable in 
whole or in part[.]" As further declared in LC. § 53-638( 4): 
( 4) Unless otherwise provided in writing in an operating agreement, ! 
member who assigns his entire limited liability company interest ceases to be a 
member or to have the power to exercise any rights of a member when the assignee 
becomes a member with respect to the entire assigned interest. 
(Emphasis added). As the district court noted (R., pg. 566) LC. § 53-626 provides that, "A limited 
liability company interest may be issued in exchange for cash, .... " 
The district court's initial finding as to what the Purchase and Sale Agreement 
contemplated was correct inasmuch as it declared that it was a transfer of "member interests in 
Real Homes, LLC." 
The express language of the Agreement, together with the evidence 
adduced at trial, is sufficient to establish that Real Properties, LLC and Sallaz and 
Trefren had a distinct and common understanding that Sallaz and Trefren would 
transfer their member interests in Real Homes, LLC, and Real Homes, LLC 
would transfer all real property it owned [ footnote omitted], to Real Properties, 
LLC in return for payment of $250,000.00 to Sallaz and Trefren. 
Memorandum Decision and Order at pp. 20-21 (R., pp. 570-71) (bracketed reference to, "footnote 
omitted," and emphasis, added). Certainly the provisions of the LLC Act, as cited above, 
permitted such a transfer of "member interests," and once Real Properties, LLC received the 
transfer of the Real Homes LLC membership interests of Sallaz and Trefren, then it was free to do 
with Real Homes as it saw fit - even to then liquidate it, if it so desired. 
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"Exhibit A" to that Agreement to Real Properties, LLC, by "free and clear title," and "free and 
clear of all encumbrances." All of these actions actually did occur. All of the real property 
was transferred - but Sallaz and Trefren never received full payment from Real Properties, LLC. 
To this day, Real Homes, LLC, continues to be listed in the Idaho Secretary of State's on-line 
database as an Idaho limited liability company in good standing, whose current registered agent is 
a Respondent in this Appeal, Janet Rice. 
The District Court found that it was the actual "execution" of the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement on January 6, 2006 which had automatically "triggered" a dissolution of Real Homes, 
LLC. This dissolution arose under the express terms of Real Homes' own operating agreement, 
as recognized by LC. § 53-642. (The district court: "By operation of the terms of the operating 
agreement and applicable Idaho statutes, Real Homes dissolved upon execution of the 
Agreement. (R., pg. 575) (emphasis added)). 
The key finding underlying the District Court's entire analysis, upon which error on this 
appeal is predicated, is the following finding that was made by that court: 
Based upon the evidence before it, the court finds that the property transferred 
by Real Homes, LLC to Real Properties, LLC pursuant to the Agreement 
constituted all or substantially all of Real Homes, LLC's assets. 
Memorandum Decision and Order at pg. 25 (R., pg. 575) (emphasis added). 
The lynchpin of the District Court's reasoning was simply that Real Homes' entry into 
dissolution was the result of the liquidation of"all or substantially all" of its assets, and Sallaz and 
Trefren were thereafter barred from transferring their member interests in that LLC to Real 
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Properties, LLC, as required under 13(a) & (b) of the 2006 Purchase and Sale Agreement, by the 
provisions of LC. § 53-644.6 
6 
up: 
53-644. Winding up. [Repealed, effective July 1, 2010.] 
- Unless otherwise provided in writing in an operating agreement: 
( 1) The business or affairs of the limited liability company may be wound 
(a) By the members or managers who have authority pursuant to section 
53-621, Idaho Code, to manage the limited liability company prior to 
dissolution; or 
(b) If one (1) or more of such members or managers have engaged in 
wrongful conduct, or upon other cause shown, by the district court on 
application of any member or any member's legal representative or 
assignee. 
(2) The persons winding up the business or affairs of the limited liability 
company may, in the name of, and for and on behalf of, the limited liability 
company: 
(a) Prosecute and defend suites; 
(b) Settle and close the business of the limited liability company; 
( c) Dispose of and transfer the property of the limited liability company; 
(d) Discharge the liabilities of the limited liability company; and 
( e) Distribute to the members any remaining assets of the limited liability 
company. 
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Because it is the actual transfer of assets held by Real Homes LLC, which is the critical 
inquiry as to the occurrence of a dissolution under Section 9 .2 of the operating agreement and I. C. 
§ 53-642, it must be pointed out that the District Court erred in its conclusion "that the 
property [was) transferred by Real Homes, LLC to Real Properties, .... " (bracketed 
reference added). The record on appeal is quite clear that the real property referenced in Exhibit 
A to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, which was to be transferred under the terms of ,I 3( c) & ( d) 
of that Agreement was not held by Real Homes, LLC, at all, but rather that property was held by 
Tradesman Contractors, LLC, and was in fact actually transferred from Tradesman Contractors 
and Construction, LLC to Real Properties, LLC in satisfaction of this obligation under the 
Agreement. (Trefren, Tr., pg. 668, LL. 9-22; pg. 671, LL. 10-16; Defendants' Exh. E, F, G, & H). 
Real Properties, LLC, Real Homes, LLC, and Tradesman Contractors and Construction, 
LLC, are separate and distinct entities. The transfer of assets from Tradesman could not trigger 
dissolution of Real Homes as a result of that action. 
In the operation of the statute, and in reliance upon Real Homes operating agreement, the 
District Court erred in invoking a transaction that involved assets that were not actually held by 
Real Homes at the time the so-called triggering event is characterized as having occurred which 
caused the alleged dissolution of Real Homes, LLC. The dissolution of Real Homes could not be 
caused by the transfer of assets it did not hold, and was not the source of the deed transferring title 
to Real Properties, LLC on January 6, 2006. 
Furthermore, if Real Homes, LLC was not an actual "going concern" entity at the time the 
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Purchase and Sale Agreement was executed on January 6, 2006, then that certainly was not 
because of a real property asset transfer that was made by Real Homes, which did not actually 
occur at that time. The fact of the matter is, the parties to the Purchase and Sale Agreement did 
consider Real Homes, LLC to be a viable going concern at that date, and that is why they entered 
into that Agreement. In fact, there was other testimony provided at trial of other assets 
contributed to Real Homes, LLC other than the subject real estate itself that constituted assets of 
Real Homes, LLC. (Trefren, Tr., pg. 610, L. 24 to pg. 612, L. 16; Trefren Tr., pg. 745 L. 14 to pg. 
746, L. 23). 
The above-referenced, Defendants' Exh. E, F, G & H, are the quitclaim deeds by which the 
real property referenced in Exhibit A to the Purchase and Sale Agreement was transferred by 
Tradesman Contractors and Construction, LLC to Real Properties, LLC. All of these deeds were 
executed on the same day as the Purchase and Sale Agreement - January 6, 2006. To a certain 
extent this entire transaction was intended to occur simultaneously, and not sequentially. 
Essentially, Real Properties, LLC obtained both the real property, and 100% control of Real 
Homes, LLC, at exactly the same moment. 
Finally, the business model used by Real Homes, LLC is fairly common in real estate 
development. Typically there is a purchase of potential development property, followed by the 
development or the transfer of those properties. By its very nature, an LLC is used as the vehicle 
to hold this property and from time to time most of those holdings would be liquidated in the 
normal course of its business. That such conduct is undertaken in the ordinary course of its 
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business would somehow be deemed a trigger to an involuntary dissolution of itself would not be 
contemplated, anticipated, or expected, especially as based upon an LLC company's own 
operating agreement that declares an event of dissolution to be the "sale of all or substantially all of 
the LLC's assets." 
Here the accepted business practice was that from time to time Real Homes was going to 
buy and liquidate its properties in the normal course of carrying-on its business. Such actions 
should not to be deemed a dissolution of itself as an entity, as a matter of law. See e.g., Blaine 
County Title Associates v. One Hundred Building Corp. Inc., 138 Idaho 517,521, 66 P.3d 221,225 
(2002) (reliance upon accepted business practices). In this appeal, the parcels of properties and 
the entire entity itself- Real Homes LLC -were transferred to another developer, Real Properties, 
LLC. No dissolution was contemplated or intended by that action. 
In summary, the absence of facts in the record that support an actual asset transfer needed 
to support the District Court's finding of a dissolution of Real Homes, LLC, argues for reversal of 
that court's decision as being clearly erroneous. Beyond that, the record does not support either 
the conclusion that all of the assets of Real Homes had been liquidated, or that in the normal 
business practice of that entity that such a dissolution was contemplated by the actions undertaken 
in the performance of the 2006 Purchase and Sale Agreement. Therefore, the District Court's 
decision that Real Properties, LLC had an affirmative defense to the enforcement of the 2006 
Purchase and Sale Agreement should be reversed, and the case remanded for a determination of 
actual damages to be awarded to Sallaz and Trefren, as a result of Real Properties, LLC's breach of 
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that express contract, the 2006 Purchase and Sale Agreement. 
B. If The 2006 Purchase And Sale Agreement Cannot Be Enforced, Then Sallaz 
And Trefren Should Have Been Awarded An Implied Contract Or Restitution 
Remedy 
In the alternative to Sallaz and Trefren's request for breach of contract remedies in Count I 
of the counterclaim, the District Court erred in denying them a remedy in unjust enrichment on 
Count III of their counterclaim. In the very last sentence of the District Court's ruling on Count I 
of the Sallaz and Trefren Counterclaim, in respect to their alleged breach of the covenant of the 
2006 Purchase and Sale Agreement, in which they asserted that they had the "absolute right to sell, 
assign and transfer" their membership interests in Real Homes, LLC to Real Properties, LLC, the 
court had concluded: 
In addition, the court concludes that such breach defeated the fundamental 
purpose of the Agreement as between Trefren and Sallaz as "co-owners" and Real 
Properties, LLC, to transfer all of the ownership interest in Real Homes, LLC to 
Real Properties. Accordingly, Count I of the Counterclaim is dismissed. 
Memorandum Decision and Order at pg. 26 (R., pg. 576) (emphasis added). 
One of the remedies requested, and denied by the DistrictCcourt, was rescission. In 
reaching the conclusion that the breach committed by Sallaz and Trefren "defeated the 
fundamental purpose of the Agreement," the District Court had determined that a substantial and 
material breach of the 2006 Purchase and Sale Agreement had in fact occurred, as set out just 
above. When the breach of a contract by one party is material, the other party's further 
performance under that contract is then excused. Melaleuca, Inc. v. Foeller, 155 Idaho 920, 924, 
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318 P.3d 910, 914 (2014). A substantial or material breach of contract is one that touches the 
fundamental purpose of the contract and defeats the very object of the parties in entering into the 
contract. JP. Stravens Planning Associates, Inc. v. City of Wallace, 129 Idaho 542,545, 928 P.2d 
46, 49 (Ct.App.1996). Rescission is an available remedy if one party materially breaches the 
contract. AED, Inc., v. KDC Investments, LLC, 155 Idaho 159,166,307 P.3d 176, 183 (2013), 
citing to, Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 73, 79, 205 P.3d 1209, 1215 (2009); and Ervin Const. 
Co. v. Van Orden, 125 Idaho 695, 700, 874 P.2d 506,511 (1993). 
Ultimately, Sallaz and Trefren simply wanted to be paid in return for the performance they 
had rendered. They had transferred their membership interest in Real Homes, LLC and the 
Riverside properties to Real Properties, LLC. In lieu of that specific performance, a rescission 
remedy would have been an appropriate alternative remedy, if feasible, with the District Court 
supervising the unwinding of the transactions, including the return of the respective properties, and 
the repayment of the consideration that had been paid to date. 
As to the issue of unjust enrichment in the place of contract damages, the District Court's 
logic was that since it had found that the 2006 Purchase and Sale Agreement "was enforceable" 
against the Plaintiffs (Roy and Janet Rice and Real Properties, LLC), that the court was therefore 
precluded from granting unjust enrichment relief to Sallaz and Trefren. The District Court's 
entire decision on this question was as follows: 
In Counterclaim Count III, Counterclaimants seek recovery for unjust 
enrichment under the Agreement and "as a result thereof ... the contract and all 
property transfers should be set aside with parties being returned to their respective 
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pre Purchase Sale Agreement Positions." 
The court first notes that Counterclaimants have not adduced any authority 
for the proposition that a rescission remedy is appropriate on an unjust enrichment 
claim. 
More importantly, "[r]ecovery cannot be had for unjust enrichment where 
there is an express contract covering the same subject matter. Thomas v. Thomas, 
150 Idaho 636,642,249 P.3d 829,386 (2011). "The reason for this rule presently 
is that the remedies for breach of an express contract, whether by law or by express 
agreement, afford adequate relief." Id. (quoting Triangle Min. Co., Inc. v. 
Stauffer Chem. Co., 753 F.2d 734, 742 (9th Cir.1985)). "[O]nly when the express 
agreement is found to be enforceable is a court precluded from applying the 
equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment in contravention of the express contract." 
Id. (quoting Wolford v. Tankersley, 107 Idaho 1062, 1064, 695 P.2d 1201, 1203 
(1984)). 
Since the court found that the Agreement was enforceable against the 
Plaintiff, Counterclaim Count II is also dismissed. 
Memorandum Decision and Order at pp. 34-35 (R., p. 584-85) (italicized emphasis in original; 
bold/underlined emphasis added). 
In the most technical sense possible, the District Court's contract analysis is correct. That 
court did in fact find, based upon the evidence that was introduced at trial, the 2006 Purchase and 
Sale Agreement was an "enforceable" express contract. The District Court also found that Real 
Properties, LLC had breached the Agreement, and that Sallaz and Trefren were therefore entitled 
to damages. 
Counterclaimants have adduced sufficient evidence to establish that Real 
Properties, LLC breached the Agreement by failing to make payment as promised 
and that such breach caused damages. 
Memorandum Decision at pg. 23 (R., pg. 573). In ruling on Real Properties, LLC' affirmative 
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defense, the District Court found that Sallaz and Trefren had been rendered incapable of 
undertaking the performance required by the contract of transferring their membership interests in 
Real Homes, LLC to Real Properties, LLC as a result of the dissolution of Real Homes, LLC 
because of the limited authority of the members to act during dissolution under LC. § 53-944, 
which authority did not include a transfer to their member interests to third parties: 
In light of the above, the court concludes that Treferen [sic] and Sallaz ... 
were not authorized to transfer the member interests in Real Homes to Real 
Properties. 
Memorandum Decision and Order at pp. 26. (R., pg. 576). 
So while it is correct that the parties to the 2006 Purchase and Sale Agreement may have 
entered into an "enforceable" express contract, that Agreement was also found by the District 
Court to be an agreement that in fact could not be performed, or be "actually enforced," and for 
which there was no actual remedy available to Sallaz and Trefren as arising out of the breach of 
that express contract. 
Therefore, the District Court's statement, as highlighted above, that "the court found that 
the Agreement was enforceable against the Plaintiff," is now being misconstrued in denying 
equitable relief, and is in error. Although the District Court did in fact find that the parties entered 
into an "enforceable" express contract when they executed the 2006 Purchase and Sale 
Agreement, the district court did not state or find that Sallaz and Trefren had the ability to 
enforce that Agreement against Real Properties, LLC. 
The District Court did correctly state the generally accepted rule with respect to unjust 
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enrichment as being an alternative remedy only, and provided if not otherwise an enforceable 
express contract. The Court in Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 203 P .3d 702 (2009) has 
summarized the general rule: 
An award for unjust enrichment may be proper even though an agreement exists. 
Wolfordv. Tankersley, 107 Idaho 1062, 1064, 695 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1984) (citing 
Hixon v. Allphin, 76 Idaho 327, 281 P.2d 1042 (1955)). The existence of an 
express agreement does not prevent the application of the doctrine of unjust 
enrichment. Only when the express agreement is enforceable is a court precluded 
from applying the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment in contravention of the 
express contract. Id. (citing Chandler v. Washington Toll Bridge Auth., 17 Wash.2d 
591, 137 P.2d 97 (1943); Hixon, supra). Once the jury determined that the 
contract was not enforceable because Appellants had proved an affirmative 
defense, the jury properly considered Respondents' claim of unjust 
enrichment. 
146 Idaho at 776-77, 203 P.3d at 706-07 (emphasis added). See also, Buku Properties, LLC v. 
Clark, 153 Idaho 828, 834-35, 291 P.3d 1027, 1033-34 (2012) ('"[a]n award for unjust enrichment 
may be proper even though an agreement exists.' Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 776, 203 P.3d 
702, 706 (2009). This occurs when the express agreement is found to be unenforceable. Id. at 
776-77, 203 P.3d at 706-07."). 
Here, although the District Court found that the parties entered into an "enforceable" 
contract, it should have also held that, as based upon its findings of fact in this case, that the 2006 
Purchase and Sale Agreement had been rendered "unenforceable" due the otherwise unanticipated 
dissolution of Real Homes, LLC that had occurred under its operating agreement when Sallaz and 
Trefren transferred all of the company's assets. As a consequence of that action, by the Court's 
analysis, the contract was not eriforceable, and Sallaz and Trefren were then, as a matter of law, 
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entitled to a remedy in unjust enrichment. Pines Grazing Assoc., Inc. v. Flying Joseph Ranch, 
LLC, 151 Idaho 924, 931, 265 P .3d 1136, 1143 (2011 ). The three elements of a claim for unjust 
enrichment are: (1) there was a benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) 
appreciation by the defendant of such benefit; and (3) acceptance of the benefit under 
circumstances that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit without payment to 
the plaintiff for the value thereof. Id., citing to, Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 558, 
165 P.3d 261,272 (2007). 
It is undisputed that both Real Homes, LLC, and the intended real property, as listed in 
Exhibit A to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, was transferred to Real Properties, LLC. By 
reference to the terms of the otherwise enforceable Agreement, the remaining unpaid contract 
value of this transaction is $181,597.18. Certainly Real Properties, LLC, and the Rices have 
appreciated this benefit, and it was, and continues to be, unjust and inequitable for them to retain 
that benefit without payment to Sallaz and Trefren for the value therefore. 
Therefore, the district court erred in denying Sallaz and Trefren a remedy in unjust 
enrichment as an alternative to the enforcement of the express contract remedy. 
C. If This Court Should Reverse The District Court, Then It Should Also 
Determine That The Appellants Sallaz And Trefren Were Entitled To An 
Award Of Attorney's Fees In The Proceedings Before The District Court 
The Counterclaim contained a request for an award of costs and attorney's fees, the latter 
being under LC.§§ 12-120 and 12-121. (R., pp. 333-34). Although the District Court found that 
Sallaz and Trefren had established the 2006 Purchase and Sale Agreement was an enforceable 
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contract, which Real Properties had breached, and that Sallaz and Trefren were entitled to damages 
they had requested in their pleading, the court nonetheless denied any relief arising out of that 
express contract or as based upon the alternative claim for unjust enrichment (R., pp. 584-85). 
The 2006 Purchase and Sale Agreement (Pl' s Exh. 41) did not contain any provision for an 
award for attorney's fees arising out of a dispute over its enforcement. That Agreement, 
providing for the sale of a limited liability company and the transfer of related potential residential 
development property, did constitute a "commercial transaction," as defined in I.C. § 12-120(3): 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes. 
Whether an action is based on a commercial transaction is a question of law over which the Court 
exercises free review. Harris, Inc. v. Foxhollow Const. & Trucking, Inc., 151 Idaho 761, 778, 264 
P.3d 400,417 (2011). In Garner v. Povey, 151 Idaho 462, 470-71, 259 P.3d 608, 616-17 (2011) 
this Court held that, "The purchase of the real estate by Gary and Nola from Povey Defendants was 
a commercial transaction under Idaho Code Sec. 12-120(3)." See also, Vanderford Co., Inc. v. 
Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 559, 165 P.3d 261, 273 (2007) ("In this case the transactions involve 
accounts, notes, guarantees, and contracts for real estate development and sales are commercial 
transactions which constitute the gravamen of the lawsuit."). 
Here, Sallaz and Trefren requested alternative relief based upon both the existence of the 
2006 Purchase and Sale Agreement, as an express contract, and upon the alternative basis of unjust 
enrichment, in the event that the 2006 Purchase and Sale Agreement was found to be 
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unenforceable. When a party alleges the existence of a contractual relationship of a type 
embraced by section 12-120(3), that claim triggers the application of that statute, and if the· 
prevailing party may recover fees even if no liability under a contract is established. Farmers 
Nat'! Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 73, 878 P.2d 762, 772 (1994). A prevailing party would be 
entitled to fees, if recovery was based upon unjust enrichment instead of an express contract. 
Erickson v. Flynn, 138 Idaho 430, 437-38, 64 P.3d 959, 966-67 (Ct.App.2002)("We hold only that 
when the quasi-contract claim is presented in the alternative to a breach of contract cause of action 
as a fallback position in the event that the contract claim fails, and where the quasi-contract claim 
is based upon the same facts and circumstances as the breach of contract claim, and the alleged 
transaction is commercial in nature, the prevailing party is entitled to recover attorney fees under 
LC.§ 12-120(3)."). 
Likewise, in the circumstances presented by the facts of this case, the parties to the 
Purchase and Sale Agreement are similarly situated to those parties to whom the court found that a 
commercial transaction existed in transactions for the development of real estate, as cited above, 
such that if this Court reverses the District Court, then the Court should also direct that Sallaz and 
Trefren should be entitled to an award of attorney's fees as prevailing parties in the proceeding 
below. 
D. If Sallaz and Trefren Prevail On This Appeal Then They Also Should Be 
Entitled To An Award Of Attorney's Fees On This Appeal 
It is well established that LC. § 12-120(3) mandates an award of attorney's fees to the 
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prevailing party on appeal as well as in the trial court. Lunders v. Estate of Snyder, 131 Idaho 
689,700,963 P.2d 372,383 (1998); I.A.R. 41. The prevailing party's entitlement to an award of 
attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) on appeal is mandatory,just as it is at trial, while the amount 
of the fees to be awarded remains discretionary. Straub v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 71, 175 P.3d 754, 
760 (2007). A prevailing party is entitled to an award of costs, as a matter of course. I.AR. 40. 
For the same reasons as set out above in Part C, concerning an award of attorney's fees in 
the proceeding below, the parties' Agreement, as set out in the 2006 Purchase and Sale Agreement 
constituted a "commercial transaction," for purposes of an award of attorney's fees under LC. § 
12-120(3). Contracts for the sale and development of real estate, and in the alternative for 
recovery upon unjust enrichment, if such express contracts cannot be enforced, constitute 
commercial transactions. Garner v. Povey, supra; Vanderford Co., Inc. v. Knudson, supra; and 
Erickson v. Flynn, supra. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the District Court denying Sallaz and Trefren damages for breach of what 
the District Court found to be an enforceable express contract that had been breached with 
resulting damages should be reversed. If such damages cannot be awarded for breach of that 
enforceable express contract, then in the alternative, Sallaz and Trefren should not be denied a 
remedy in the nature of restitution arising out of either rescission or unjust enrichment. 
If the District Court is reversed, then Sallaz and Trefren should also be awarded their costs 
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and attorney's fees as prevailing party's in the proceeding below under I.C. § 12-120(3). 
If Sallaz and Trefren are determined to be the prevailing parties on this appeal, then they 
should be awarded their costs and reasonable attorney's fees under I.C. § 12-120(3) in pursuing 
this appeal. 
Respectfully Submitted this 30th day of January, 2015. 
Vernon K. Smith 
Attorney for the Appellants 
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